Critical Theory in the Favelas

By Stijn De Cauwer

I first read about the work of the Observatório de Favelas in the great book Radical Cities by Justin McGuirk (Verso, 2014). This organization in the vast and sprawling favela Complexo da Maré in Rio De Janeiro was founded by the social geographer Jailson de Souza e Silva. Besides being a place for research about life in the favelas, the organization also houses the Escola Popular de Comunicação Crítica (ESPOCC). It has always been the dream of Jailson to start an alternative university in the favelas, in which educational programs would be combined with critical reflection about life there. Out of a personal interest in alternative education projects and curious to see how “critical theory” is put to use in a specific context, I decided to visit this place during my current stay in Rio.

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Various recent developments, however, have made visiting Complexo da Maré—a series of connected favelas that blended together over time—not so inviting. Maré is not one of those favelas that the city of Rio has attempted to turn into some kind of a tourist attraction. Recently, the violence in Maré has flared up once again. Two rivalling drug gangs fight to control the favela, with its inhabitants in the crossfire, and, making matters worse, the army has attempted to control the favela, which has added to the violence. During carnival, the fighting became so widespread that the highways near Maré, including the highway to the airport, were closed. It was precisely the violence of the army, causing casualties wherever they operate, that Marielle Franco denounced. Marielle was born in Complexo da Maré and made it to the Rio city council, where she continued her struggle for the people in the favelas. Last week, she was shot in downtown Rio. Her assassination strongly affected and shocked the people of Brazil. At the university where she was supposed to speak this week, a protest event was held. Murals with the slogan “Marielle presente” can be seen all over city. Even David Byrne dedicated the last song of his show in Rio to her. If I was not accompanied by a local friend who is familiar with the area, I would probably not have taken a bus to Maré.

Several photos of Marielle are hanging on the wall as we enter the Observatório. We are guided by Piê, who explains that the past week was very hectic for them with the murder of Marielle and the many protests that were organized in the wake of her death. Piê is a former student of the Escola Popular de Comunicação Crítica. Because of the fact that university education is relatively expensive in Brazil and the Temer government has implemented heavy cutbacks in academic funding and grants, university education is mostly out of reach for the inhabitants of Maré. The Observatório offers free courses that are part of two programs: one program teaching the students audiovisual skills and photography for the purposes of citizens’ journalism and another program in digital culture. The one-year programs lead to a degree that is acknowledged by the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Some of the students have been able to adopt their skills in various cultural projects throughout the city. Because the classes take place in the Observatório, the students are also involved in the debates and research going on there concerning the conditions of the favelas, as well as the activism against the continuous violence experienced by the inhabitants and the so called “pacification” of the favelas. After several years of successfully running the program, Piê also acknowledges that recent political and economic developments have affected the funding of the organization, making it difficult to continue the educational programs at this time.

The day before this visit, I presented a paper at a large academic conference in Rio De Janeiro, partly organized by the Academia Brasileira De Filosofia. Probably as an overreaction to safety concerns in Rio, the conference was held inside the old military academy near the beach of Leme. The general absurdity and stuffy pompousness of this kind of academic conference, with posh receptions in the presence of the consuls of various countries and a dress code, was made all the more bizarre by the location. Entering the conference was only possible after showing one’s badge at an army checkpoint. Our PowerPoint presentations were even installed by uniformed soldiers. The usual dreary presentations were disrupted by the occasional blaring of an army trumpet. The contrast with the idealistic attempts of the people of the Observatório to offer academic education and critical theory to the inhabitants of Rio could not be bigger.

For more information:
http://of.org.br/en/http://of.org.br/en

http://of.org.br/areas-de-atuacao/educacao/espocc-2/ (in Portugese)

The​ ​Neurotic​ ​Turn: Inter-Disciplinary Correspondences on Neurosis.

Neurotic turn

Recently Charlie Johns edited an extremely interesting book that works through the argument that neurosis is the dominant condition of our society today. An array of thinkers, as Graham Harman, Benjamin Noys, Patricia Reed, Dany Nobus, John Russon, Charles Johns and Katerina Kolozova, have addressed the following question: How can the concept of ‘Neurosis’ help us understand the new digitized world in which we live and our place in it?

 

An ​interview​ ​with Charlie Johns and​ ​Anna​ ​Zhurba​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Moscow Museum​ ​of​ ​Modern​ ​Art​ ​(MMOMA).

A.Z.: What​ ​is​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​technological​ ​progress​ ​and​ ​neurosis?

C.J.: The​ ​phrase​ ​‘technological​ ​progress’​ ​is​ ​already​ ​a​ ​dubious​ ​one;​ ​is​ ​progress​ ​determined culturally​ ​qua​ ​differences,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​are​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​progress​ ​to​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​(standard​ ​of living​ ​etc.)?​ ​If​ ​we​ ​made​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​between​ ​progress​ ​and​ ​proliferation​ ​we​ ​could,​ ​however, suggest​ ​that​ ​neurosis​ ​is​ ​progress.​ ​Why?​ ​Neurosis​ ​is​ ​essentially​ ​the​ ​hyper-sensitivity towards​ ​-​ ​and​ ​determination​ ​of​ ​-​ ​concepts.​ ​Whether​ ​we​ ​describe​ ​concepts​ ​as​ ​a​ ​type​ ​of clothing​ ​draped​ ​over​ ​the​ ​‘unknown’​ ​world,​ ​or​ ​whether​ ​we​ ​describe​ ​concepts​ ​as​ ​autopoietic agencies​ ​in​ ​their​ ​own​ ​right,​ ​it​ ​still​ ​amounts​ ​to​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​on​ ​a​ ​phenomenological​ ​level; we​ ​interact,​ ​assign​ ​and​ ​orient​ ​our​ ​lives​ ​via​ ​concepts​ ​(or​ ​-​ ​if​ ​you​ ​will​ ​-​ ​conceptual​ ​sign systems/semiotics).​ ​Second​ ​nature​ ​is​ ​superimposed​ ​onto​ ​a​ ​putative​ ​first​ ​nature​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is inevitable​ ​that​ ​further​ ​concepts​ ​will​ ​be​ ​produced​ ​and​ ​ensue.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​we​ ​are​ ​living​ ​in​ ​a highly​ ​proliferated​ ​conceptual​ ​world,​ ​where​ ​many​ ​concepts​ ​do​ ​not​ ​even​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​an​ ​object, representation,​ ​or​ ​what​ ​some​ ​philosophers​ ​have​ ​called​ ​‘the​ ​real’.​ ​Neurosis​ ​is​ ​the exaggeration​ ​of​ ​such​ ​a​ ​viewpoint​ ​(which​ ​can​ ​be​ ​found​ ​in​ ​various​ ​thinkers​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Hegel, Deleuze​ ​and​ ​especially​ ​Baudrillard).

It​ ​would​ ​actually​ ​be​ ​more​ ​cogent​ ​to​ ​think​ ​of​ ​concepts​ as a type of technology,​ ​after​ ​all,​ ​every form​ ​of​ ​naming​ ​and​ ​crafting​ ​is​ ​also​ ​a​ ​conceptual​ ​form​ ​(it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​conceptual​ ​signature​ ​onto putative​ ​external/material​ ​reality).​ ​The​ ​world​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​and​ ​their​ ​uses​ ​is​ ​also​ ​a​ ​world​ ​of conceptual​ ​functions​ ​(remember​ ​that​ ​we​ ​put​ ​those​ ​uses​ ​there​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​place),​ ​a​ ​conceptual cartography​ ​which​ ​helps​ ​us​ ​navigate​ ​as​ ​humans.​ ​Following​ ​Heidegger,​ ​and​ ​later Wittgenstein,​ ​we​ ​become​ ​aware​ ​that​ ​we​ ​are​ ​always​ ​already​ ​within​ ​this​ ​conceptual technology;​ ​taking​ ​up​ ​speech​ ​and​ ​language​ ​for​ ​instance,​ ​using​ ​pre-existing​ ​equipment​ ​to enable​ ​mastery​ ​over​ ​ourselves​ ​and​ ​our​ ​world.​ ​What​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fore​ ​in​ ​my​ ​concept​ ​of neurosis​ ​is​ ​that​ ​such​ ​‘embeddedness’​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world​ ​could​ ​also​ ​be​ ​limiting​ ​and​ ​ignorant; Wittgenstein​ ​famously​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​“when​ ​I​ ​obey​ ​a​ ​rule,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​choose,​ ​I​ ​obey​ ​the​ ​rule blindly”​ ​(Wittgenstein,​ ​Philosophical​ ​Investigations).​ ​Neurosis​ ​is​ ​the​ ​pessimistic​ ​counterpart to​ ​the​ ​Hegelian​ ​notion​ ​that​ ​a​ ​culture​ ​can​ ​be​ ​swept​ ​along​ ​by​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​conceptual​ ​paradigm, or​ ​the​ ​Humean​ ​notion​ ​that​ ​we​ ​gain​ ​knowledge​ ​through​ ​experience​ ​qualified​ ​through​ ​custom and​ ​habit​ ​(i.e​ ​compulsive​ ​repetition).

Regardless​ ​of​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​assertion​ ​that​ ​concept​ ​and​ ​craft​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​reduced​ ​to​ ​either one​ ​domain,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​say​ ​in​ ​an​ ​everyday​ ​sense​ ​that​ ​technology​ ​(as​ ​we​ ​know​ ​it)​ ​aids​ ​this neurosis​ ​because​ ​it​ ​constantly​ ​generates​ ​and​ ​re-inserts​ ​concepts/symbols​ ​back​ ​into​ ​the​ ​lived social​ ​experiential​ ​domain,​ ​creating​ ​a​ ​high​ ​intensity​ ​of​ ​concepts​ ​and​ ​a​ ​type​ ​of​ ​redoubling​ ​of the​ ​concept​ ​onto​ ​the​ ​human​ ​(think​ ​advertisements)​ ​that​ ​are​ ​akin​ ​to​ ​traumatising​ ​the​ ​subject (technologies​ ​modes​ ​of​ ​distraction,​ ​seduction​ ​and​ ​capture).

Neurosis​ ​is​ ​a​ ​philosophy​ ​‘beyond​ ​good​ ​and​ ​evil’​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​the intensity,​ ​exaggeration,​ ​proliferation​ ​and​ ​dissemination​ ​of​ ​concepts​ ​without​ ​recourse​ ​to judging​ ​them​ ​as​ ​‘good’​ ​or​ ​‘bad’​ ​(this​ ​is​ ​not​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​semantics​ ​is​ ​absent​ ​in​ ​the​ ​concept).

Neurosis​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​mean​ ​‘bad’,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​used​ ​partly​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​to​ ​light​ ​how​ ​we​ ​are affected by​ ​concepts,​ ​as​ ​Marcuse​ ​and​ ​Fromm​ ​knew,​ ​‘bad’​ ​and​ ​‘good’​ ​are​ ​only​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the ideologies​ ​of​ ​a​ ​society.​ ​Using​ ​the​ ​Freudian​ ​dynamic​ ​of​ ​the​ ​pleasure​ ​principle​ ​may​ ​be​ ​an interesting​ ​exercise​ ​however.​ ​Neurosis​ ​is​ ​against​ ​any​ ​humanist​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘way​ ​out’​ ​of​ ​the impasse​ ​of​ ​determinism,​ ​it​ ​in-fact​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​constructs​ ​such​ ​as​ ​‘genius’​ ​and​ ​‘freedom’ should​ ​be​ ​reconceptualised​ ​as​ ​compulsive​ ​repetitious​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​concept​ ​production​ ​as opposed​ ​to​ ​any​ ​moral,​ ​supernatural​ ​or​ ​metaphysical​ ​definition.

I​ ​am​ ​giving​ ​you​ ​a​ ​philosophical​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​your​ ​question,​ ​however,​ ​one​ ​can​ ​easily​ ​see​ ​a relatively​ ​straightforward​ ​link​ ​between​ ​technological​ ​‘progress’​ ​and​ ​neurosis,​ ​such​ ​a​ ​link being​ historical. That​ ​link​ ​would​ ​be​ ​the​ ​instantiation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​neurosis​ ​by​ ​William Cullen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mid-eighteenth​ ​century​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Industrial​ ​Revolution​ ​arising​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time. Both​ ​events​ ​are​ ​in​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​interchangeable;​ ​the​ ​neurotic​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​totalization​ ​and positivism​ ​found​ ​in​ ​the​ ​spirit​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Industrial​ ​Revolution,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​sudden​ ​affair​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human sensorium​ ​with​ ​the​ ​exotic​ ​and​ ​intense​ ​rates​ ​of​ ​speed,​ ​power,​ ​seduction,​ ​and​ ​claustrophobia of​ ​technology​ ​that​ ​made​ ​us​ ​in​ ​turn​ ​slow,​ ​weak,​ ​naive​ ​and​ ​powerless,​ ​such​ ​effects condensing​ ​as​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​neuroses​ ​(foreign​ ​thoughts​ ​and​ ​general​ ​anxiety).

In​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​the​ ​Industrial​ ​Revolution​ ​has​ ​simply​ ​proliferated​ ​in​ ​our​ ​present​ ​epoch​ ​(one​ ​can call​ ​it​ ​Advanced​ ​Capitalism​ ​or​ ​Late​ ​Capitalism​ ​or​ ​Globalization​ ​etc).​ ​When​ ​Psychoanalysis came​ ​onto​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​with​ ​Freud​ ​and​ ​Jung,​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​event​ ​had​ ​happened,​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​impasse where​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​was​ ​reasserted​ ​within​ ​the​ ​domain​ ​of​ ​technological​ ​determinism.​ ​It​ ​was in​ ​a​ ​sense​ ​necessary​ ​that​ ​repressed​ ​powers​ ​of​ ​sexuality,​ ​violence​ ​and​ ​taboo​ ​were​ ​to​ ​be disclosed​ ​by​ ​psychoanalysis,​ ​as​ ​such​ ​powers​ ​were​ ​in​ ​contradistinction​ ​to​ ​technology​ ​(i.e technology​ ​was​ ​not​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​as​ ​sexual​ ​or​ ​rebellious,​ ​these​ ​were​ ​traits​ ​affirmed​ ​by​ ​man​ ​in human​ ​nature).​ ​The​ ​relation​ ​of​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​technology​ ​that​ ​I​ ​am​ ​personally​ ​interested​ ​in is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​contra-distinctive​ ​one​ ​however​ ​(a​ ​relation​ ​made​ ​by​ ​differences)​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​one​ ​of interconnectedness;​ ​the​ ​technological​ ​presentation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​subconscious​ ​into​ ​the​ ​realm​ ​of photography,​ ​film​ ​and​ ​animation,​ ​and​ ​vice​ ​versa,​ ​the​ ​arrival​ ​of​ ​such​ ​visual​ ​technology​ ​into the​ ​human​ ​mind,​ ​man’s​ ​thoughts​ ​and​ ​his​ ​dreams.​ ​For​ ​me​ ​Walter​ ​Benjamin​ ​becomes​ ​a​ ​great guide​ ​for​ ​this​ ​phenomenon.​ ​Using​ ​his​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Optical​ ​Unconscious​ ​we​ ​simultaneously become​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​the​ ​‘repressed’​ ​phenomena​ ​in​ ​visual​ ​culture​ ​(​ ​disclosing​ ​the​ ​twenty​ ​four frames​ ​that​ ​make​ ​up​ ​a​ ​filmic​ ​second,​ ​the​ ​zoom​ ​of​ ​the​ ​camera​ ​lense​ ​penetrating​ ​into​ ​a​ ​new world​ ​of​ ​images​ ​etc)​ ​and​ ​also​ ​the​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​image​ ​itself.​ ​All​ ​one​ ​needs​ ​is​ ​a​ ​representation and​ ​that​ ​is​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​get​ ​the​ ​neurosis​ ​started.​ ​The​ ​representation​ ​in-fact​ ​takes​ ​on​ ​a​ ​new meaning​ ​distinct​ ​from​ ​the​ ​object​ ​or​ ​referent​ ​and​ ​harnesses​ ​its​ ​own​ ​phenomenological powers​ ​(look​ ​at​ ​the​ ​subliminal​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​image,​ ​it’s​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​become​ ​recognized​ ​in collective​ ​consciousness​ ​such​ ​as​ ​certain​ ​brands​ ​and​ ​icons).​ ​This​ ​is​ ​partly​ ​why​ ​Jean Baudrillard​ ​characterised​ ​the​ ​image​ ​as​ ​“fundamentally​ ​immoral”​ ​(Baudrillard​ ​Live,​ ​Selected Interviews,​ ​Gane,​ ​Routledge,​ ​1993). As​ ​I​ ​have​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​my​ ​introduction​ ​to​ The Neurotic Turn (Repeater​ ​Books,​ ​2017),​ ​this relation​ ​between​ ​contemporary​ ​human​ ​consciousness​ ​(neurosis)​ ​and​ ​technology​ ​can​ ​be sentimentalised​ ​in​ ​different​ ​ways.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ Frankenstein effect whereby​ ​the technology​ ​that​ ​was​ ​implemented​ ​and​ ​integrated​ ​by​ ​society​ ​for​ ​utilitarian​ ​purposes​ ​has reached​ ​the​ ​point​ ​where​ ​it​ ​has​ ​transgressed​ ​such​ ​moral​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​goals​ ​and​ ​is​ ​now​ ​the source​ ​of​ ​our​ ​ills​ ​(we​ ​watch​ ​technology​ ​turn​ ​its​ ​head​ ​away​ ​in​ ​neglect​ ​of​ ​us,​ ​like​ ​how​ ​Dr Frankenstein​ ​does​ ​with​ ​his​ ​monster).​ ​Or,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​be​ ​less​ ​romantic​ ​and​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​there should​ ​be​ ​no​ ​lament​ ​of​ The Real,​ ​or​ ​of​ ​the​ ​‘peasant’​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​instead​ ​insist​ ​that​ ​conceptual formation​ ​would​ ​have​ ​become​ ​highly​ ​simulated​ ​in​ ​its​ ​own​ ​right​ ​anyway,​ ​or​ ​that​ ​a​ ​legitimate contemporary​ ​ontology​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​do​ ​away​ ​with​ The Real ​(in​ ​any​ ​objective​ ​sense)​ ​and understand​ ​processes​ ​of​ ​neurosis,​ ​extrapolation​ ​and​ ​simulation​ ​as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​‘in-itself’.

A.Z.: Do​ ​you​ ​see​ ​any​ ​productive/​ ​positive​ ​outcome​ ​in​ ​liberating​ ​neurosis​ ​from​ ​its​ ​repressed status?

C.J.: Yes​ ​I​ ​do​ ​very​ ​much.​ ​Similar​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​spirit,​ ​I​ ​believe​ ​we​ ​as​ ​humans​ ​can​ ​be​ ​a​ ​bit more​ ​sensitive,​ ​aware​ ​and​ ​cautious​ ​of​ ​the​ ​prejudice​ ​and​ ​bias​ ​we​ ​act​ ​out​ ​on​ ​a​ ​minute​ ​to minute​ ​basis.​ ​By​ ​learning​ ​to​ ​heuristically​ ​separate​ ​ourselves​ ​from​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​we​ ​inhabit and​ ​produce,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​take​ ​an​ ​analytical​ ​approach​ ​which​ ​is​ ​both​ ​enlightened,​ ​post-human​ ​and traditionally​ ​psychological;​ ​1)​ ​we​ ​can​ ​analyse​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​or​ ​strength​ ​of​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​at​ ​our disposal​ ​and​ ​can​ ​question​ ​which​ ​concepts​ ​may​ ​be​ ​beneficial​ ​and​ ​non-beneficial​ ​to​ ​our objectives​ ​and​ ​our​ ​behaviour.​ ​2)​ ​we​ ​can​ ​move​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​embodied,​ ​impassioned​ ​view​ ​of concept​ ​formation​ ​as​ ​inextricably​ ​linked​ ​to​ ​human​ ​subjectivity​ ​and​ ​our​ ​drives​ ​(seen​ ​in​ ​Hume and​ ​areas​ ​of​ ​Nietzsche).​ ​3)​ ​we​ ​can​ ​ask​ why a​ ​person​ ​is​ ​articulating​ ​certain​ ​concepts​ ​in certain​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​define​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​in​ ​concept​ ​production,​ ​transmission​ ​and reception,​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​defining​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​in​ ​an​ individual​(this​ ​notion​ ​is​ ​sympathetic​ ​to various​ ​‘criminals’​ ​outlawed​ ​and​ ​the​ ​sidelining​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mentally​ ​ill​ ​in​ ​society).​ ​The​ ​concepts​ ​at our​ ​disposal​ ​are​ ​precisely​ ​that;​ ​ours,​ ​and​ ​we​ ​must​ ​learn​ ​where​ ​they​ ​come​ ​from​ ​and​ ​under what​ ​circumstance​ ​they​ ​can​ ​prove​ ​to​ ​have​ ​purchase.​ ​Although​ ​this​ ​may​ ​sound​ ​inhuman​ ​and rationalistic,​ ​the​ ​alternative​ ​would​ ​be​ ​technological​ ​nihilism​ ​or​ ​solipsistic​ ​Nietzscheanism, you​ ​choose.​ ​In​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​I​ ​am​ ​still​ ​following​ ​that​ ​tradition​ ​of​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​socio-cultural criticism​ ​found​ ​in​ ​Marcuse​ ​and​ ​Fromm;​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​liberate/​ ​disclose​ ​what​ ​is​ ​left​ ​repressed by​ ​ourselves​ ​and​ ​our​ ​institutions,​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​guarantee​ ​a​ ​less​ ​one-dimensional​ ​man​ ​and culture.​ ​Saying​ ​this,​ ​however,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​neurosis​ ​truly​ ​can​ ​be​ ​liberated; psychoanalysis​ ​does​ ​not​ ​assume​ ​a​ ​perfect​ ​end​ ​state​ ​(in​ ​fact​ ​it​ ​denies​ ​the​ ​very​ ​possibility​ ​and is​ ​thoroughly​ ​pessimistic​ ​in​ ​this​ ​respect).​ ​Psychoanalysis,​ ​I​ ​believe,​ ​is​ ​more​ ​about​ ​process and​ ​transformation.​ ​All​ ​we​ ​can​ ​hope​ ​to​ ​do​ ​is​ ​transform​ ​ourselves​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world​ ​we are​ ​implicated​ ​in.​ ​The​ ​worst​ ​situation​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​stalemate.​ ​That​ ​for​ ​me​ ​is​ ​the​ ​true​ ​meaning of​ ​nihilism.

A.Z.: How​ ​do​ ​public/collective​ ​and​ ​private/subjective​ ​realms​ ​relate​ ​to​ ​each​ ​other​ ​in​ ​your reading​ ​of​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​the​ ​neurotic?

C.J.: There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​distinction​ ​in​ ​my​ ​view.​ ​As​ ​I​ ​have​ ​stated​ ​above,​ ​the​ ​intersubjectivity​ ​of​ ​man​ ​and technology​ ​has​ ​always​ ​been​ ​there,​ ​in​ ​concepts,​ ​in​ ​language,​ ​in​ ​craft,​ ​in​ ​techne,​ ​in​ ​society etc.​ ​The​ ​main​ ​difference​ ​now​ ​is​ ​how​ ​we​ ​view​ ​this​ ​intersubjectivity;​ ​at​ ​first​ ​we​ ​acknowledged the​ ​union​ ​but​ ​believed​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​primarily​ ​for​ ​man’s​ ​benefit.​ ​We​ ​used​ ​philosophical​ ​notions such​ ​as​ ​freedom,​ ​final​ ​cause,​ ​virtue​ ​and​ ​teleology​ ​to​ ​qualify​ ​the​ ​position​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​the​ ​realm of​ ​man​ ​who​ ​had​ ​goals​ ​and​ ​purpose,​ ​technology​ ​being​ ​simply​ ​a​ ​means​ ​to​ ​an​ ​end.​ ​With​ ​the advent​ ​of​ ​various​ ​doctrines​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Marxism​ ​this​ ​sentiment​ ​had​ ​changed​ ​and​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a much​ ​more​ ​negative​ ​(albeit​ ​only​ ​at​ ​first)​ ​view​ ​of​ ​technology​ ​as​ ​deterministic​ ​and all-pervasive.​ ​The​ ​reason​ ​I​ ​bring​ ​this​ ​up​ ​is​ ​because​ ​I​ ​think​ ​technology​ ​allows​ ​us​ ​to​ ​think about​ ​the​ ​private/public​ ​dichotomy​ ​with​ ​more​ ​clarity.​ ​Language​ ​is​ ​always​ ​already​ ​a technology​ ​where​ ​one​ ​is​ ​implicated​ ​within​ ​but​ ​never​ ​fully​ ​owns.​ ​Perception,​ ​likewise,​ ​is always​ ​produced​ ​socially,​ ​and​ ​such​ ​an​ ​‘order​ ​of​ ​things’​ ​is​ ​not​ ​found​ ​explicitly​ ​within​ ​one’s own​ ​perception.​ ​The​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​this​ ​interconnectedness​ ​has​ ​been​ ​described​ ​since​ ​the dawn​ ​of​ ​Western​ ​philosophy​ ​(but​ ​much​ ​development​ ​has​ ​been​ ​made​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Continental tradition​ ​of​ ​philosophy).​ ​I​ ​am​ ​probably​ ​the​ ​most​ ​pessimistic​ ​philosopher​ ​of​ ​this​ ​‘deterministic’ interconnected​ ​tradition​ ​(following​ ​Baudrillard​ ​in​ ​many​ ​respects).​ ​Neurosis​ ​attempts​ ​to characterise​ ​the​ ​contamination​ ​(Derrida)​ ​and​ ​bricolage​ ​(Levi​ ​Strauss)​ ​of​ ​meaning​ ​within contemporary​ ​consciousness​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​the​ ​conflation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​ ​poles​ ​private​ ​and​ ​public. Someone​ ​is​ ​always​ ​plugged​ ​into​ ​someone​ ​else,​ ​speaking​ ​as,​ ​for​ ​or​ ​through​ ​someone​ ​else (this​ ​is​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​capitalism;​ ​retail​ ​service,​ ​customer​ ​service,​ ​etc.).​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​side, the​ ​‘private’​ ​domain​ ​has​ ​never​ ​been​ ​exteriorised​ ​more​ ​than​ ​in​ ​the​ ​21st​ ​century;​ ​with​ ​the advent​ ​of​ ​facebook,​ ​instagram,​ ​twitter​ ​etc​ ​personal​ ​life​ ​is​ ​public​ ​life​ ​and​ ​all​ ​positive​ ​meaning between​ ​the​ ​chafing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​ ​has​ ​disappeared.​ ​What​ ​I​ ​am​ ​more​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​nowadays​ ​is not​ ​the​ ​private/public​ ​dichotomy​ ​but​ ​the​ ​secret/non-secret​ ​dichotomy.​ ​The​ ​true​ ​secret, always​ ​there​ ​in​ ​psychoanalysis,​ ​always​ ​there​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mad​ ​and​ ​the​ ​criminally​ ​insane,​ ​the concept​ ​that​ ​one​ ​man​ ​may​ ​be​ ​hiding,​ ​is​ ​keeping,​ ​like​ ​a​ ​form​ ​of​ ​property​ ​etc.​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​wish​ ​to know​ ​these​ ​secrets,​ ​and​ ​perhaps​ ​this​ ​is​ ​the​ ​last​ ​fruitful​ ​life​ ​of​ ​the​ ​romantic​ ​concept​ ​of authenticity​ ​or​ ​identity​ ​within​ ​human​ ​civilization.

A.Z.: What​ ​are​ ​the​ ​main​ ​historical​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​popular​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​neurotic?

C.J.: I​ ​would​ ​not​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​be​ ​an​ ​expert​ ​at​ ​answering​ ​this​ ​question,​ ​but​ ​I​ ​believe​ ​the​ ​shift​ ​is enormous​ ​in​ ​many​ ​ways.​ ​If​ ​we​ ​even​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​anchor​ ​it​ ​to​ ​its​ ​psychological​ ​home​ ​we​ ​will find​ ​it​ ​challenging.​ ​Neurosis​ ​is​ ​disclosed​ ​in​ ​1769​ ​by​ ​Dr.​ ​William​ ​Cullen.​ ​Not​ ​to​ ​take​ ​it​ ​away from​ ​Dr​. ​Cullen​ ​but​ ​we​ ​can​ ​gauge​ ​philosophically​ ​why​ ​this​ ​had​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​case;​ ​psychology had​ ​‘developed’​ ​to​ ​a​ ​point​ ​in​ ​the​ ​eighteenth​ ​century​ ​where​ ​‘symptoms’​ ​were​ ​assumed​ ​to come​ ​from​ ​exclusively​ ​material,​ ​biological​ ​and​ ​organic​ ​processes.​ ​Many​ ​mental​ ​disturbances (such​ ​as​ ​neurosis​ ​and​ ​psychosis)​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​discerned​ ​by​ ​this​ ​method​ ​(physiologically​ ​or causally).​ ​At​ ​the​ ​time,​ ​scientific​ ​legitimacy​ ​depended​ ​on​ ​its​ ​allegiance​ ​to​ ​the​ ​material​ ​world hypothesis​ ​(against​ ​superstition​ ​etc).​ ​However,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mid​ ​1700’s​ ​the​ ​enlightenment​ ​ideal​ ​of the​ ​individual​ ​was​ ​taking​ ​place​ ​(one​ ​can​ ​see​ ​Immanuel​ ​Kant’s​ ​debt​ ​to​ ​the​ ​father​ ​of​ ​Early Modern​ ​Philosophy​ ​Rene​ ​Descartes)​ ​and​ ​this​ ​was​ ​against​ ​the​ ​scientific​ ​realism​ ​supporting certain​ ​psychological​ ​discourses​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time.​ ​Hence​ ​‘neurosis’​ ​was​ ​adopted​ ​by​ ​this​ ​new mind-set​ ​and​ ​disclosed​ ​as​ ​both​ ​mental​ ​and​ ​subjective​ ​(it​ ​was​ ​later​ ​adopted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same non-scientific​ ​way​ ​by​ ​Romanticism​ ​and​ ​given​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​‘tension’/​ ​cathexis​ ​(the​ ​moving elements,​ ​the​ ​relation​ ​between​ ​man​ ​and​ ​nature)​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​a​ ​solitary​ ​denotation).​ ​Before then,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​writings​ ​of​ ​Christian​ ​Wolffe,​ ​and​ ​even​ ​in​ ​the​ ​pre-Socratics,​ ​neurosis​ ​was characterised​ ​as​ ​either​ ​‘mind’​ ​or​ ​‘soul’​ ​(soul​ ​pertaining​ ​to​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​world,​ ​the​ ​‘world-soul’). Although​ ​I​ ​find​ ​these​ ​earlier​ ​characterisations​ ​illuminating,​ ​I​ ​find​ ​that​ ​Cullen​ ​picked​ ​up​ ​upon the​ discomforting ​quality​ ​of​ ​the​ ​psyche,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​is​ ​of​ ​main​ ​interest​ ​to​ ​me.​ ​So​ ​already​ ​there you​ ​have​ ​a​ ​large​ ​shift​ ​of​ ​the​ ​term​ ​psyche;​ ​from​ ​soul,​ ​spirit,​ ​nature,​ ​to​ ​simply​ ​‘the​ ​mental’,​ ​and later,​ ​with​ ​Cullen,​ ​the​ ​term​ ​neurosis​ ​is​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​instantiation;​ ​the​ ​moment​ ​when​ ​mind​ ​and spirit​ ​is​ ​reflected​ ​in​ ​an​ ​eighteenth​ ​century​ ​mind​ ​now​ ​bridled​ ​with​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​passing​ ​into​ ​a new​ ​phase​ ​of​ ​alienation.​ ​In​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​I​ ​see​ ​Cullen’s​ ​instantiation​ ​of​ ​neurosis​ ​as​ ​the condensation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Gothic​ ​quality​ ​of​ ​mind;​ ​the​ ​ghosts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​machine,​ ​the​ ​nightmare​ ​images of​ ​irrationality​ ​(think​ ​of​ ​Goya’s​ The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters).

In​ ​popular​ ​culture,​ ​however,​ ​neurosis​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​have​ ​been​ ​embraced​ ​(Patricia​ ​Friedrich​ ​talks about​ ​those​ ​characters​ ​we​ ​love,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​those​ ​played​ ​by​ ​Woody​ ​Allen​ ​and​ ​the​ ​character​ ​of Patrick​ ​Bateman​ ​in​ ​American​ ​Psycho​ ​etc.,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​ ​ ​book​ The Neurotic Turn, Repeater​ ​Books).​ ​In​ ​literature​ ​too​ ​we​ ​have​ ​a​ ​line​ ​of​ ​thinkers​ ​from​ ​Dostoevsky,​ ​Bataille​ ​and Barthes,​ ​and​ ​later​ ​we​ ​could​ ​say​ ​that​ ​almost​ ​everyone​ ​in​ ​the​ ​21st​ ​century​ ​has​ ​an​ ​element​ ​of what​ ​Freud​ ​had​ ​called​ ​‘narcissistic​ ​personality​ ​disorder.​ ​’​ ​As​ ​I​ ​said,​ ​I​ ​am​ ​not​ ​an​ ​expert​ ​in​ ​the social​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​neurotic,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​obvious​ ​-​ ​at​ ​least​ ​on​ ​a​ ​surface​ ​level​ ​-​ ​that​ ​the neurotic​ ​has​ ​been​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​accepted​ ​‘outsider’​ ​figures​ ​in​ ​the​ ​twentieth​ ​and twenty-first​ ​century.​ ​Research​ ​has​ ​to​ ​be​ ​done​ ​into​ ​exactly​ ​why​ ​this​ ​is.​ ​I​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is because​ ​the​ ​traditional​ ​psychological​ ​neurotic​ ​was​ ​diagnosed​ ​with​ ​what​ ​we​ ​are​ ​all​ ​beginning to​ ​realise​ ​we​ ​have​ ​too,​ ​and​ ​was​ ​always​ ​there​ ​in​ ​some​ ​repressed​ ​form;​ ​a​ ​renewed​ ​sensitivity to​ ​the​ ​onslaught​ ​of​ ​concepts,​ ​an​ ​awareness​ ​of​ ​the​ ​compulsive​ ​repetition​ ​inherent​ ​in​ ​any​ ​act of​ ​making​ ​meaningful,​ ​the​ ​daunting​ ​anxiety​ ​of​ ​feeling​ ​the​ ​value​ ​of​ ​personal​ ​identity​ ​wither away​ ​in​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​neutral,​ ​indifferent​ ​postmodernism.

A.Z.: What​ ​is​ ​your​ ​description​ ​of​ ​neurosis​ ​and​ ​is​ ​it​ ​a​ ​‘first​ ​world​ ​problem’?

C.J.: A​ ​neurosis​ ​is​ ​any​ ​trajectory​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​that​ ​you​ ​abide​ ​by​ ​(whether​ ​willingly​ ​or​ ​unwillingly).​ ​It names​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​experiencing​ ​consciousness​ ​without​ ​knowing​ ​where​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​from​ ​and where​ ​it​ ​is​ ​leading​ ​you.​ ​You​ ​are​ ​in​ ​a​ ​sense​ ​‘in​ ​the​ ​middle’​ ​of​ ​consciousness,​ ​hence,​ ​you​ ​are the​ ​patient,​ ​or​ ​the​ ​victim.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​neurosis​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​as​ ​only​ ​a​ ​first​ ​world problem.​ ​Every​ ​human​ ​participates​ ​in​ ​this​ ​role​ ​of​ ​consciousness,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​everyone participates​ ​in​ Geist ​in​ ​Hegel.​ ​However,​ ​yes,​ ​neurosis​ ​has​ ​always​ ​been​ ​an​ ​exaggerated​ ​form of​ ​thought-processing,​ ​the​ ​traditional​ ​neurotic​ ​(of​ ​the​ ​diagnosed​ ​kind)​ ​gives​ ​us​ ​a​ ​clue​ ​as​ ​to the​ ​future​ ​state​ ​of​ ​cognition,​ ​he/she​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​the​ ​first​ ​that​ ​recognises​ ​it.​ ​Most​ ​of​ ​our​ ​thoughts do​ ​not​ ​have​ ​direct​ ​reference​ ​to​ ​‘physical​ ​reality’.​ ​I​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​think​ ​about​ ​something​ ​that​ ​I​ ​am perhaps​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​do,​ ​told​ ​by​ ​someone​ ​else.​ ​I​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​think​ ​about​ ​how​ ​someone​ ​else​ ​might think​ ​about​ ​me.​ ​I​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​realise​ ​that​ ​the​ ​objective​ ​of​ ​my​ ​thoughts​ ​are​ ​simply​ ​to​ ​attain symbolic/imaginary​ ​goals​ ​such​ ​as​ ​sexual,​ ​monetary​ ​and​ ​social​ ​status.​ ​I​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​understand that​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​intrinsic​ ​to​ ​my​ ​thought​ ​processes​ ​have​ ​nothing​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​maintaining​ ​social stability,​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​uphold​ ​any​ ​moral​ ​sense​ ​or​ ​moral​ ​value​ ​etc.​ ​The​ ​proliferation​ ​and sensitivity​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​in​ ​neurosis​ ​is​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​dissolution​ ​and​ ​homogenising​ ​of​ ​traditional meaning​ ​(the​ ​subsequent​ ​relentless​ ​production​ ​of​ ​commodity​ ​fetishism​ ​everywhere​ ​in​ ​life).​ ​In this​ ​respect​ ​you​ ​could​ ​say​ ​that​ ​‘neurosis’​ ​is​ ​an​ ​anthropological​ ​description​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​in​ ​the ‘first-world’​ ​…​ ​but​ ​neurosis​ ​does​ ​not​ ​go​ ​away​ ​if​ ​you​ ​find​ ​concrete​ ​uses​ ​for​ ​it​ ​in​ ​nature;​ ​the eskimo​ ​is​ ​just​ ​as​ ​neurotic​ ​when​ ​he​ ​attributes​ ​eleven​ ​different​ ​meanings​ ​to​ ​the​ ​phenomenon snow.

The​ ​Neurotic​ ​Turn​ ​book​ ​is​ ​now​ ​available​ ​through​ ​Repeater​ ​Books.

https://repeaterbooks.com/product/the-neurotic-turn-inter-disciplinary-correspondences-on-neurosis/

“Thrown Across The Room”: Heather O’Neil’s ‘The Lonely Hearts Hotel’

By Laura Smith

 

“You can pick up a book but a book can throw you across the room.”

—Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects, p.122

 

the-lonely-hearts-hotel-by-heather-o-neillThe Lonely Hearts Hotel is the most recent novel by Canadian author, Heather O’Neil. It is the story of Pierrot and Rose; orphans, who both, in differing circumstances, nearly die at birth but miraculously survive against the odds. O’Neil’s novel begins against the backdrop of Pierrot’s and Rose’s childhoods, spent together at a Montreal orphanage in the early part of the twentieth-century. Both the nuns and the other children at the orphanage recognize that Pierrot and Rose are special; through music, dance, and play they manage to cultivate pockets of joy out of their dismal realities. While the nuns do their best to stifle Pierrot’s and Rose’s flourishing (as well as their connection), the other children delight in the magic that is brought into their otherwise fragile and violent existences. From here, the novel follows the two protagonists as life takes them in differing yet equally dark directions. Despite their separation, both hold onto their childhood promise to one another of a shared future. Nineteen-thirties Montreal becomes the stage for make-believe, unlikely friendships, poverty, theft, theater-troops, addiction, sex, and mafia-life. Written with unparalleled imagery in the form of metaphor and simile, O’Neil’s prose come alive in the imagination like an illustrated fable stretching out before the reader, spontaneously coming into being as each page is turned. When a nun is described as reminding Pierrot of “a glass of milk” and “clean sheets blowing in the wind at the exact moment when the water evaporated from them and they became dry and light and easy again,” the reader is not tripped up by this strange mix of subject/object but instead sees the sunlight on those sheets, the rolling hills in the distance, and almost smells the fresh country air.[1]

The Washington Post called The Lonely Hearts Hotel “virtually cinematic.” Indeed, it unfolds in the reader’s mind as if on stage, in the darkened theater, and in vivid color. This book is a fairy tale and, more specifically, a fairy tale for adults. The book is, among many things, an examination of how trauma persists and yet, how it can be overcome, transformed into another energy rather than denied. Themes of vulnerability, pain, guilt, shame, love—and most profoundly—what it might mean to be free, linger well after the reader closes the book. The novel addresses sex from the rapture of lovers, to the indifference of prostitution and pornography, to the horrors of assault and abuse. O’Neil creatively plays with the inversion of gender roles and with notions of female desire.[2] The Lonely Hearts Hotel succeeds in the difficult task of intertwining the most destined of love stories, a true romance, with a fierce and unrelenting feminism. Rose “felt the grandeur of being responsible for oneself. She was independent, and her actions had enormous consequences.”[3] The lean Pierrot, on the other hand, a Heathcliff-like lover without all the possession and brooding, is the sort of young man whose fist “would probably [punch] like a pillow.”[4] It turns out to be the clowns and gangsters of the story who, sharing a similarly acute perceptivity, best understand—perhaps better even than the protagonists themselves—the lovers’ connection.

The Lonely Hearts Hotel is a tale of survival and of the degrees of resilience. O’Neil unravels how, for better or worse, our interior worlds bring our exterior worlds into being. There is a Benjaminian-like understanding that it is precisely the very ruins of everyday life which point, paradoxically, to a larger “truth content.” This book is a magical vortex that draws the reader in (and will likely liquidate any plans you foolishly had foreseen for your day). The power of O’Neil’s work resides in the fact that, when the reader resurfaces from this other world, their own reality feels slightly different; it collides vertiginously with the fresh experience of this other imaginary space. With The Lonely Hearts Hotel, O’Neil proves that to conjure enchantment can be empowering rather than solely romantic. This novel, and in particular, its ending, is likely not only to stay with its readers but to shift and continue to reveal itself in different ways, across time, in its readers’ consciousnesses. This reader will take author Kelly Link’s advice now and go “read all the rest” of O’Neil’s work.

 

External Links:

Writer’s Trust of Canada podcast: Author Heather O’Neil on The Lonely Hearts Hotel:

https://soundcloud.com/writerstrust/author-heather-oneill-on-the-lonely-hearts-hotel

 

CBC Ideas with Paul Kennedy (O’Neil on Wisdom in Nonsense)

http://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/writer-heather-o-neill-finds-wisdom-in-an-eccentric-father-s-advice-1.4512242

 

[1] Heather O’Neil, The Lonely Hearts Hotel, p.14.

[2] For more on this, visit the Writer’s Trust of Canada link and hear O’Neil explain these themes.

[3] Heather O’Neil, The Lonely Hearts Hotel, p.369.

[4] Ibid., p.323.

A “literary” graphic novel?

By Jan Baetens

David SalaSala1

Le Joueur d’échecs (d’après Stefan Zweig)

Paris : Casterman, 2017, 129 p.

ISBN : 978-2-203-09347-8

 

Although graphic novels are now considered part of literature, only very few are literary adaptations in the traditional sense of the word. What makes the graphic novel a work of literature is not its literary sources (preferably high-literary ones, bearing some traces of the original material supposed to add prestige and cultural value), but the fact that it has a single author who, on top of that, also has a recognizable style and voice. Hence, inevitably, the success of autobiography and semi-autobiographical fiction in the field: to tell one’s own story is the easiest way to proclaim one’s difference as well as one’s distinction, and the unique features of the story told are the best possible guarantee that the author’s style will also be acknowledged as personal and unique.

In spite of a powerful cliché, to adapt a literary work is not an easy task; that is,  it is not easy to cash in on the reputation of the adapted work. To adapt is, instead, a minefield. The possible dangers are countless, and they are even bigger in the case of the adaptation of a well-known and much-loved work. For, even readers who have never read the original will have a certain idea of what it is and thus of what they expect the adaptation to be. When the author of the adaptation takes the supplementary risk of remaining faithful to the original –for, in spite of another devastating cliché, it is much more difficult to produce a convincing faithful adaptation than to reshape the original in order to cater to the tastes of either the maker or the public–, the dangers are even bigger.

It should therefore not come as a surprise that the graphic novel field does not present many examples of literary adaptations, the work of Kafka being a noticeable exception (but there the dangers are somewhat reduced by the sheer number of existing adaptations in all possible genres and media, which reduce the anxiety of influence). Zweig’s “The Royal Game” or “Chess Story” (1941), the last novella published by Stefan Zweig before his suicide, has been adapted to the screen and to the stage, but as far as I know, never in graphic novel format. Sala’s adaptation is a great accomplishment, which can be read at three levels: first,  as an independent creation; second, in comparison with the original novella; third, in relationship with current tendencies in the graphic novel, which is forced to supersede its autobiographical bias and post-underground stylistic tropisms. In all these cases, Sala’s work is amazing, and one can only hope that it will soon become a textbook example of how to make a literary adaptation in “bande dessinée” (that wonderful word that helps us question the comics vs graphic novel divide in new ways).

 

Food culture, much more than a lifestyle

By Jan Baetens

Food is a key theme in cultural studies, but often the approach focuses on the negative or problematic aspects of it: anorexia and other eating disorders, obesity and fat studies, outdoor eating rituals and social distinction, the critique of deeply rooted national preferences as a form of modern “mythology” (in the sense of Roland Barthes), the commercialization of snootiness, and the relationship between alimentary habits and climate change.

Interesting as these topics may be, they overlook the most essential part of food: the pleasure that is in both making, serving and eating dishes and the joy of sharing it with others, in words and images, either on the spot, while preparing and consuming the food, or afterwards, for instance by making a comic on the many delights food can give us. Such a comic is Comme un chef (“Like a Chef”), a collaboration between Benoît Peeters, novelist, critic, theoretician, but also biographer of Jacques Derrida and scriptwriter of the famous The Obscure Cities series (http://www.theobscurecities.com/home/), and Aurelia Aurita, the comics author best known for Fraise and Chocolat (“Stawberry and Chocolate”), a work exploring the many joys of sex seen from a female point of view and unfortunately not yet available in English (https://lesimpressionsnouvelles.com/catalogue/fraise-et-chocolat-lintegrale/).

comme un chefLike a Chef is a work with a double focus. It is, in the very first place, an autobiography, or at least in part, but it is also a vibrant presentation of gastronomy, more particularly the various types of the “new cuisine”, an approach to cooking and food presentation in French cuisine. In contrast to classic cuisine, an older form of haute cuisine, new cuisine is characterized by lighter, more delicate dishes, an increased emphasis on presentation, and the desire to make cooking as innovative and surprising as, for instance, art. Both perspectives come neatly together in the person of Benoît Peeters who, as a young author (he published his first novel at age 20), had to try to make a living. His love for food as well as his lust for innovation encouraged him to try his luck as a cook, and the book reports his many gastronomic adventures in the first years of his adult life, from the discovery –a nearly religious epiphany– of the new cuisine in the restaurant of the Troisgros brothers to his personal contacts with some great chefs such as Willy Slawinksi from the Apicius restaurant in Ghent and Ferrian Adrià from El Bulli.

Comme un chef is thus a very personal book, but also an extremely comical one. Instead of giving a “biopic” presentation of the new cuisine –this would have been the default option in the contemporary graphic novel, where many authors’ lack of ideas and imagination recycle documentary material in comics format, often with very boring results–, Benoît Peeters tells his own experiences within the new cuisine movement. His book is not a portrait gallery of great chefs or an illustration of famous dishes, but its own life as reconstructed with the help of the new food culture. It is permanently both hilarious and inspiring. One does not find real recipes here, but a funny yet very smart narrative of a young food lover and would be chef learning how to eat (how to order in a great restaurant for instance when one has no money and does not obey the dress code) and how to prepare food by trial and error (how to react for example to customers who ask the young new cuisine chef to make a very traditional dinner).

The beauty and dash of this autobiography is also much indebted to the vivid drawing style of Aurélia Aurita, who strikes the right balance between a more cartoonish presentation of the characters and the necessity to carefully reproduce a large amount of factual information. The chemistry works perfectly, and one can easily bet that the collaboration between Peeters and Aurita will set a new tone in the often uneventful and quite stereotypical current of biographical graphic novels.


Benoît Peeters & Aurélia Aurita, Comme un chef

Paris : Casterman, 2018, 216 pages, 18,95 € (ISBN : 9782203146754)

 

50 Key Terms in Contemporary Cultural Theory

Anthropocene, posthumanism, biopolitics… Terms such as these have not only become very popular in academic circles, but they are also increasingly used in public debates, catalogues of exhibitions and policy documents. Sometimes a term suddenly becomes a fashionable buzzword, only to go out of fashion as quickly as it gained attention, but there are also terms that people keep on using because they help us to understand something important about contemporary society.

finale cover 50 Key Terms croppedIn the book 50 Key Terms in Contemporary Cultural Theory, edited by Joost de Bloois, Stijn De Cauwer and Anneleen Masschelein, 50 important terms are explained by 35 scholars. In short texts, the history and context of each term is explained, as well as the debates that the term has triggered. Each text is followed by a short bibliography for further reading. There are terms that help us to understand contemporary political challenges: precarity, immaterial labor, biopolitics, common(s), anthropocene, surveillance, debt, cultural memory, agonism, multitude, spectacle, post-truth and political theology. Some terms help us to understand new media developments: algorithm, open access, digital cultural heritage, convergence, archive and network. Other terms help us to come to terms with the diversity of human life: intersectionality, heteronormativity, posthumanism, postfeminism, postcolonialism and crip theory. Some terms are deceptively simple but they have a complex history and their use has become the object of critical research in the Humanities: love, war, life, justice, immunity, noise, image, participation, crisis, creativity, performance, rhythm, curating and that mysterious notion people like to use so easily, culture. Certain terms may be considered to be somewhat outdated in the public opinion but they have continued to be relevant in the Humanities: utopia, class and ideology. Finally, there are terms which have become much-debated theoretical terms: accelerationism, plasticity, affect, individuation, speculation, medicalization and the sensible.

Amongst the 35 authors in this book, there are several staff members of the Cultural Studies program (Anneleen Masschelein, Stijn De Cauwer, Jan Baetens, Jonas Rutgeerts, Leni Van Goidsenhoven, Silvana Mandolessi, Laura Smith, Clarissa Colangelo, Gert-Jan Meyntjens, Heidi Peeters) and the Literary Studies department (Elke D’Hoker, Tom Chadwick, Michiel Rys, Jan Vanvelk, Tom Willaert).

With this book, the authors hope to clarify the meaning and use of these 50 key terms, which can be of great value to comprehend some of the challenges we all face today. The terms are not only of interest for students or researchers, but also for policy makers, people working in the art world and other cultural domains and people active in social and environmental organizations. Anybody who wants to take part in debates about the current political, social or cultural state of affairs will inevitably encounter these terms and this book will be a useful guide.

In Leuven, the book will be available in book stores such as Acco.
https://www.pelckmanspro.be/50-key-terms-in-contemporary-cultural-theory.html#gref

 

The Killing of a Sacred Deer, dir. Yorgos Lanthimos (2017)

By Laura Smith

An archaic theme plays out in the interior world of a wealthy nuclear family. The superficiality and formality with which the members of the family relate to one another, in speech and interaction, creates a sense of unreality, planting a seed of doubt in the viewer’s mind as to the plane on which the drama unfolds. The Killing of a Sacred Deer is described as a psychological horror. I am not sure horror, or even thriller—perhaps a thriller of inevitability—describe the film but rather a psychological disruptor, a psychological tornado, in which the tornado passes through the onscreen world quietly and in uncannily slow motion. It leaves behind debris of all sorts.

FilmImageThe film opens with an uncomfortable scene, thrusting the viewer head on to the heart of the matter. This initial anxiety rings like white noise throughout the film, increasing and decreasing in pitch, but penetratingly constant. Its only pitch-equal is the closing scene that, while quite a different image, echoes the initial degree of discomfort with which the viewer has been coping for the last 115 minutes.

The story and its name are based on Greek mythology. It is a story that seems completely out of place in the present, with its brutal and archaic rules for justice. Collin Farrell’s character, Steven, is a successful surgeon and head of household who has an unlikely friendship with a teenage boy, Martin (Barry Keoghan). In his review for RogerEbert, Brian Tallerico underscores that Steven plays the role of God, while Martin, who in increasing increments turns the family’s immaculate world upside down, plays that of the Devil. However, this categorical dichotomy twists like hot metal as the story unfolds and the viewer becomes aware of the doctor’s many and serious ‘shortcomings’. As Tallerico points out, the world of Steven appears, next to that of the boy’s, to be demonic rather than mortal. This demonic reversal from Martin to the family is again challenged when Anna, played by Nicole Kidman, acts in a Christ-like manner towards the supposed Devil, dressing his wounds and kissing his feet.

What remains most interesting is the treatment of bodies in the film. The disturbing sexual practice of “playing assault” with his wife is not merely a strange bit of character development, but rather can be understood as a central point around which the film turns. This film, beyond “science versus supernatural thematics” is one of bodily—figurative and literal—relations. When Martin is invited to the doctor’s home, his children—a girl of 15 and boy a few years younger, are curious to see Martin’s body. He is asked about his body hair and he, in turn, repeats this curiosity in his relationship with the older doctor. What is striking is that the doctor’s family, his wife and children, seem to miss evident facts about his body: Steven’s wife only notices his beautiful hands after strangers point them out, his son boasts of his father’s abundant body hair, which turns out to be more than an exaggeration. While we can chalk up the last example to an instance of a younger boy trying to impress an older boy, it remains pertinent that, to his family, Steven does not seem human, but rather is simultaneously a divine authoritarian and a shell, a simulation. Moreover, in Steven’s treatment of their bodies, his family seems likewise both spectral and (explicitly) objectified.

The Killing of a Sacred Deer seems, on the surface, to be a straight-forward cliché tale of an eye for an eye or a heart for a heart. However, the consistently manipulated degrees of anxiety reproduce in the viewer what is experienced as an automation of paranoid connections and their reversals, a seeming celestial, although immanent equation with no solution. We are not so much—or only—left wondering about the age-old questions of sacrifice, guilt, and justice, but about the world in which such extremes of the mythic and the modern appear as simply two sides of the same coin.


The Killing of a Sacred Deer is currently in Cinema Zed http://www.cinemazed.be/

Reviews: https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/the-killing-of-a-sacred-deer-2017

Robert Doisneau at the Musée d’Ixelles

By Laura Smith

The French twentieth-century photographer Robert Doisneau has become synonymous with his image of Le baiser de l’hôtel de ville (1950), which shows a mise en scène of a couple embracing amidst the street’s hustle and bustle. Fans of Doisneau, or simply visitors of Paris, will recognize many of his black and white photographs from their popular postcard form, most notably his series of café scenes, scenes of daily life, of artists and children. The exhibition, now on at the Musée d’Ixelles, displays both classic and many lesser-known images of his black and white collections spanning roughly 1930-1970, alongside vibrant colourful photographs of Palm Springs, California in the 60’s.

Doisneau

The museum’s interior architecture, which allows for visits of a circular flow, supports the exhibition’s three movements; Le Merveilleux quotidien, which displays photographs including FFI au repos (1944) and La dernière valse du 14 juillet (1949), images of cafés, marriages, and glimpsed moments; Palm Springs 1960, a collection produced for the February 1961 issue of Fortune magazine that shows, in bright blues, yellows and soft pinks the leisure life of Americans on the golf course and by the pool side, and Ateliers d’artistes, which allows for a view inside the studios of Picasso, Utrillo, Giacometti, Le Corbusier and many others. Particular delights from this last section include Tinguely – portrait de l’artiste (1959) and Niki de St Phalle (1971). For Doisneau fans, this exhibition is a chance to see gems from his collection (L’Atelier Robert Doisneau) and to discover unknown, surprising and impressive works by the artist. For those looking to get acquainted with the photographer’s work, this exhibition displays his ability to capture moments of socio-historical importance and the lifestyle of the everyday in Paris and Palm Springs. While the shift from the American golf course to the Parisian atelier at first felt like a cliché new-world/old-world dichotomy, the juxtaposition between the classic iconic black and white images with those vibrant photographs of Palm Springs—the latter of which is set against a wall of bubble-gum pink—highlights a continuity of striking composition and an attentiveness to daily gestures that connects such diverse contexts. Both the fan and the discoverer of Doisneau’s work come away from this exhibition with a renewed sense that it is in the mundane everyday that one catches glimpses of the joy, the humour, and the theatricality of life, if we are attentive. I myself found a new favourite image in, Fête à la maternelle de Gentilly (1934).

The Doisneau exhibition is on now and runs until 04.02.2018 at the Musée d’Ixelles (rue Jean Van Volsem 71, 1050 Bruxelles).

Links:
http://www.museedixelles.irisnet.be/
https://www.robert-doisneau.com/en/atelier/

 

Barbie, Inc.

By Jan Baetens

Everybody knows the situation: a delayed flight, and nothing more to read. Airport literature is then the answer to all our anxieties. In this case, it was entitled Swing Time (2016, Penguin edition in 2017) and its author is Zadie Smith. 453 pages of which I read 91 during the flight. I stopped in the middle of a sentence and did not go on to page 92, despite the multiple incentives that litter the volume. Swing timeThe book has indeed an exceptionally long blurb section, which starts at the front cover, continues on the back cover, appears to cheer up the interior cover pages and quite a lot of the front matter. In short: no less than nine pages of praise of a “superb”, breathtaking”, and “brilliant” book, which only made me yawn.

For skeptical readers, excessive blurb always sounds suspect and my own reading only confirmed this intuition. Imagine a novel where the author has tried to combine the following three constraints:

  1. List and mix everything that may illustrate the modern, cosmopolitan life of a bobo (please don’t forget issues of race, class and gender).
  2. Be cool and try to surprise with crisp dialogues and a “well written” style, but never forget that easy reading is the key of success.
  3. Target an audience as broad as possible (think of all the translations and how people abroad think of London, New York and West Africa) and cater to all possible reader groups.

Zadie Smith applies all these rules in an amazingly efficient way (after all, she also teaches creative writing, and one can guess that her work holds a top place in book discussion groups all over the world). The result is perfect plastic literature. Barbie and Ken may do and experience and say and think everything that the Mattel dolls are not allowed to, but they remain dolls. What Zadie Smith is writing is Barbie literature for post-young adults. Let’s hope the film will be better.

Mimesis as anti-Figura

By Jan Baetens

Porter1James I. Porter’s “Disfigurations: Erich Auerbach’s Theory of Figura” (Critical Inquiry, vol. 44-1, 2017, pp., 80-113) is one of the best essays I’ve read in recent months. It is a rereading of Erich Auerbach’s seminal study “Figura” of 1938 as well as a vital contribution to the cultural analysis of reading and storytelling, not in the empirical, but in the philosophical sense of the word.

At first sight, “Figura” is a typical philological study on the many meanings of this word and the semantic field it organizes. On a less superficial level, it is a reflection on two conflicting types of reading and interpretation by a German professor, one of the founding fathers of modern comparative literature, who had been forced to abandon his position at the university due to the Nazi anti-Jew laws. In “Figura”, Auerbach mainly distinguishes the allegorical way of reading, which wipes out the concrete historical event told by a story in favor of its symbolic and extra-temporal meaning, and the figural one, which maintains the reality of the historical event while reframing it as the symbolic announcement of some later event. The Christian reinterpretation of the Jewish tradition as a prefiguration of the New Testament is the classic example of such a conflict between allegorical and figural reading and the no-less-classic example of the victory of the figural over the allegorical. The figural will become the hegemonic way of reading between early Christianity, when this type of reading appears, and the Renaissance, when it rapidly vanishes as a dominating type of interpretation (after the Renaissance, the hegemony shifts from figural reading to “realist” reading, in a society whose dominant paradigm is increasingly that of science).

Porter2For contemporary readers, however, Auerbach (1892-1957) is not the author of “Figura” but of Mimesis, written in exile between 1942 and 1945. Mimesis, which has never been out of print, is a study of the progressive emergence of “realism” in Western literature, that is of a way of interpreting that emphasizes the literal, not the symbolic meaning of the text, even if the literal meaning is open to debate, and that highlights how stories are rooted in concrete historical and material contexts. Auerbach scholarship generally focuses either on “Figura” or on Mimesis, but rarely brings together both studies, as if the author’s attention had simply shifted from classic philology and symbolic reading to comparative literature and realism. Yet in “Disfigurations”, this is exactly what James I. Porter does: rereading Mimesis in light of “Figura”, not in order to find a dialectic synthesis of the two apparently conflicting poles, but in order to disclose the profound continuity in Auerbach’s thinking as well as the crucial importance of “realism” in the genesis and meaning of Mimesis itself, which was written in exile in Turkey (a then militantly nonreligious state). Auerbach’s great book, Porter argues, should be read not just as a defense of Western realism, but as a reaction against the symbolic –be it figural or, worse, allegorical– that was defended by Nazi philosophy, philology, theology, etc., to delete not only Jewish history and Jewish tradition but the typical way in which the Jewish tradition read its own stories, namely as realist stories deeply rooted in precise historical conditions yet utterly ambivalent and ambiguous –and therefore inevitably open to endless interpretation and reinterpretation and permanently inviting us to question our own relationship to the specific environment in which we are living here and now (including our fundamental incapacity to produce final and fixed meanings).

I must confess that I did not know James I. Porter’s work. Shame on me, but I have the excuse that he is working in a field (critical theory of ancient literature) that is not mine. Thanks to Critical Inquiry, the leading journal in my field, this excuse is now no longer valid, and of course I immediately ordered this book: Erich Auerbach. Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach. Ed. James I. Porter. Trans. Jane O. Newman. Princeton University Press, 2013. I haven’t read it yet, but I already recommend it very warmly!